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Russia vis-à-vis Iran
Witold Rodkiewicz
Russia’s relations with Iran are almost entirely based on geopolitical assumptions. Both states 
are interested in weakening the position the United States holds in the region; both have 
a common enemy in the form of Sunni extremism. Combined with the successful cooperation 
in Syria, which is not devoid of elements of rivalry, these priorities make Russia and Iran stra-
tegic partners in the Middle East. 
Iran in Russia’s Middle Eastern strategy
• Relations with Iran in the context  
of Russia-US relationships 
Russia approaches its relations with Iran as 
a part of a wider geopolitical game with the 
United States, with its main objective being the 
attempt to find an optimum balance between 
three conflicting goals. The first goal involves 
maintaining and preferably strengthening Rus-
sia’s ‘strategic partnership’ with Iran. The sec-
ond consists of avoiding confrontation with the 
United States and minimising the adverse con-
sequences of Russian-Iranian cooperation for re-
lations between Moscow and Washington. The 
third and least important goal involves prevent-
ing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or at 
least delaying this process. The second goal has 
recently been substantively modified. In the sit-
uation of an escalating political confrontation 
between Russia and the United States, the goal 
of Russian politics is to avoid an open military 
confrontation with the US and its main ally in 
the region, i.e. Israel.
Russia’s ‘strategic partnership’ with Iran is 
mainly based on the common interest Moscow 
and Tehran have in curbing the power of the 
US. Tehran, for its part, is predominantly inter-
ested in the regional dimension of this power, 
whereas Moscow is also interested in its glob-
al aspect. According to Vladimir Sazhin, one of 
Russia’s leading experts on Iran, “it cannot be 
ruled out that Moscow’s priority interest lies in 
the fact that Tehran’s policy is largely anti-West-
ern, both in its global and regional aspect”. 
For Iran, Russia is the only source of both weap-
onry and nuclear technologies. Moreover, due 
to its right to veto in the UN Security Council, 
it is capable of protecting Iran against Wash-
ington attempting to use UN mechanisms to 
increase UN pressure on it. Russia sees Iran’s 
policy in the post-Soviet area as an important 
element of the ‘strategic partnership’. Not only 
did Tehran avoid rivalry with Moscow there, but 
it also loyally cooperated with it (see the sup-
port Iran offered to the pro-Russian leadership 
in Tajikistan and Armenia and the fact that it 
distanced itself from Chechen separatism).
Alongside this, Russia was using its coopera-
tion with Iran to strengthen its bargaining po-
sition towards the United States, by suggesting 
to Washington that it would be ready to lim-
it its contacts with Tehran at a specific price. 
The most evident manifestations of Moscow’s 
instrumental approach to Iran was its support 
in 2010 for a UN Security Council resolution 
regarding sanctions against Iran, and its par-
tial embargo on arms exports to Iran in 2010. 
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This was intended as reciprocal move in ex-
change for the cancellation under Barack Oba-
ma’s administration of the original plan to de-
ploy elements of the US’s ABM shield in Central 
Europe, together with the signing of the new 
START treaty, which are of key importance for 
ensuring Russia’s strategic parity with the Unit-
ed States.
• The significance of the Middle East for the 
Russian foreign policy 
Russia’s policy in the Middle East is part of a wid-
er strategy aimed at creating an international or-
der which would shield Russia against Western 
interference in its internal affairs. Such an order 
should also enable Russia to have a key voice in 
determining political-military arrangements (re-
gional orders) in regions adjacent to the post-So-
viet area. That means that Russia’s Middle East-
ern policy is subordinated to the Kremlin’s global 
strategy towards Washington, while at the same 
time Russia seeks to create in the Middle East 
a regional variant of what it believes to be the 
best model of the international order, i.e. a con-
cert of powers that would include, apart from 
Russia, the regional powers of Turkey, Iran, Israel 
and Saudi Arabia, as well as the United States 
(provided the latter gives up its ‘hegemonic hab-
its’). At the same time, the Kremlin’s striving to 
restore Russia’s great power position in the Mid-
dle East was intended to serve to legitimise Pu-
tin’s regime in the eyes of both the Russian elite 
and Russian population at large (and to a certain 
extent continues to do so). 
From Moscow’s point of view, the Middle 
East is divided into two fundamentally differ-
ent zones. The first one consists of Turkey and 
Iran, and the second one consists of the Arab 
states and Israel. Turkey and Iran are adjacent 
to the post-Soviet area and are the Russian Fed-
eration’s neighbours across the Black Sea and 
Caspian Sea basins. The two countries have 
long traditions of imperial statehood, major 
economic and military potential, and growing 
regional ambitions. Both also have sufficient 
resources to effectively compete with Moscow 
for influence in the post-Soviet states, and even 
use soft power measures to influence follow-
ers of Islam and ethnic compatriots within the 
Russian Federation. The other zone does not di-
rectly neighbour the post-Soviet area and none 
of the countries that constitute it have sufficient 
potential to effectively aspire to regional pow-
er status. Because of those differences, Russia’s 
policy towards each of the zones is based on 
different assumptions. 
Turkey and Iran are seen in Moscow as serious 
geopolitical players and relations with them 
feature high on Russia’s political agenda. Mos-
cow treats the two states as regional powers 
and views them as its partners in building the 
‘multi-polar’ international order (at least in 
the regional dimension) and in stabilising the 
post-Soviet area. 
Moscow tends to treat the states making up 
the second zone (the Arab states and Israel) 
as an instrument. This is due to the fact that 
they are located at a greater distance from the 
post-Soviet area, have more modest geopoliti-
cal ambitions (Israel) and less impressive capa-
bilities (Saudi Arabia). In its relations with them, 
Moscow mainly focuses on collaboration in im-
portant, albeit rather narrow areas of interest 
(Israel – high technology, avoidance of military 
incidents in Syria; Saudi Arabia – coordination 
of oil market policy). 
Russia’s Middle Eastern policy is subor-
dinated to the Kremlin’s global strategy 
towards Washington, at the same time 
Russia seeks to create a regional order 
based on the model of a concert of powers.
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• The Syrian context of Moscow’s relations 
with Tehran
The rapprochement between Moscow and Teh-
ran over the Syrian issue could be observed 
back in 2011 in connection with the two coun-
tries’ similar assessment of the Arab Spring. 
Both Moscow and Tehran saw the upheavals 
as a US-inspired potential threat to both their 
internal orders and their geopolitical positions 
in the Middle East. Both feared that the Arab 
Spring could lead to a strengthening of the 
United States in the region or an activation of 
radical Sunni movements. For Iran, that would 
also entail a strengthening of Saudi Arabia, its 
main geopolitical rival in the region. 
Another important date in the development of 
Russian-Iranian relations was September 2015, 
when Russia launched its direct military inter-
vention in Syria in order to salvage the regime 
of Bashar al-Assad, which was trying to sup-
press a military uprising backed by Sunni king-
doms from the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Ara-
bia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates), Turkey and 
the United States.
As a consequence, both Iran and Russia be-
came involved in defending the Assad regime 
in Syria. When Russia launched its military in-
tervention in the autumn of 2015, Moscow 
and Tehran became de facto allies in the war, 
which was an internal conflict in Syria but also 
a regional and global conflict between foreign 
powers supporting the different sides in the 
Syrian civil war. The intervention was preceded 
by at least several months of military consulta-
tions as part of which General Qasem Soleima-
ni, commander of the elite unit of Iran’s Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps who was in charge 
of coordinating Iran’s military support for the 
Assad regime, visited Moscow in July 2015. This 
resulted in an unprecedented intensity of polit-
ical contacts between Russia and Iran. 
• The relations with Iran in the context  
of Russia’s Middle Eastern policy
The political relations between Russia and Iran 
are an intertwined nexus of both common 
and divergent interests. The common interests 
seem to be prevailing, at least from Moscow’s 
point of view. Russia and Iran have converging 
interests in limiting the presence and influence 
of the United States in the region, as well as 
in bringing about the final victory of Bashar 
al-Assad’s regime in the Syrian civil war and in 
legitimising this regime in the international are-
na. However, even in Syria the Iranian-Russian 
alliance is not lacking elements of competition, 
in terms of influence over the Assad regime and 
of various tactical differences. In the end, both 
sides seem to assume that they are fated to co-
operate in Syria.
What complicates Russian-Iranian relations are 
the relationships with the remaining major ac-
tors on the Middle Eastern political scene. Iran 
is in sharp conflict with Israel, which is of fun-
damental importance for both sides and which 
in fact is a low-intensity undeclared war. Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are engaged in a sharp ide-
ological and geopolitical rivalry in which Saudi 
Arabia is backed by the majority of Sunni king-
doms from the Arabian Peninsula. Russia, for its 
part, is interested in maintaining good relations 
with Israel. In recent years, it has also made at-
tempts to improve and tighten its relations with 
Saudi Arabia. Generally speaking, in its policy 
in the region, Russia intended to nurture good 
relations with all the major actors while simul-
taneously remaining neutral in the devastating 
conflicts and disputes present in the region 
(with the obvious exception of the Syrian con-
flict). Russia openly stated that it is not a party 
to the Shia-Sunni religious dispute and called 
on the representatives of the two branches of 
The rapprochement between Moscow 
and Tehran over the Syrian issue was trig-
gered by the two countries’ similar as-
sessment of the Arab Spring.
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Islam to engage in dialogue and seek a peaceful 
modus vivendi. Similarly, it distanced itself from 
the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Persian Gulf and 
called on the two sides to alleviate the tension 
by creating a regional dialogue mechanism to 
include all the interested parties.
Russia took a similarly neutral stand regard-
ing the war between Israel and Iran that was 
waged mainly on the Syrian territory. In the au-
tumn of 2015, after the launch of its military 
intervention in Syria, Russia accepted the Israeli 
proposal to create a mechanism for preventing 
incidents between the armed forces of the two 
states in Syria. This enabled the Israeli air force 
to hit Iranian targets in Syria without the risk 
that it might itself become a target for Russian 
anti-aircraft defence systems deployed in Syria. 
The Russian side, for its part, tried to take into 
account Israel’s arguments regarding the lim-
itation of the presence of Iranian forces and 
pro-Iranian militias in the part of Syria which is 
adjacent to Israel. In the summer of 2017, Russia 
backed the offensive of the Syrian government 
forces against the units organised by anti-As-
sad opposition, which had controlled this por-
tion of the Syrian territory. At the same time, 
it assured Israel that in the cross-border zone 
(which, according to several media reports, in-
cluded a strip of land along the Israeli-Syrian 
border reaching 50-85 km into the Syrian terri-
tory) no Iranian troops and pro-Iranian militias 
will be allowed to operate (according to Israeli 
media, Russia has failed to keep this promise).
Although on the one hand Russia tolerates 
the strikes carried out by the Israeli air force 
in Syria, on the other it evidently limits this air 
force’s freedom to act. This was particularly ev-
ident when in September 2018, during an Is-
raeli air strike, the Syrian anti-aircraft defence 
mistakenly shot down a Russian military plane. 
The Russian side blamed Israel for the incident, 
called on Israel to limit the number of strikes 
and offered Syria a relatively advanced an-
ti-aircraft defence system S-300 (the delivery 
of which it had previously suspended to meet 
Israel’s demands).
The Turkish context is equally important for 
Russia’s relations with Iran, particularly regard-
ing Syria. A tripartite consultation mechanism 
involving the three states has been in place 
since 2016 to coordinate and harmonise their 
actions in Syria (where the three of them have 
a military presence). Although Russia has more 
convergent interests in Syria with Iran than with 
Turkey (Russia and Iran support Assad and his 
attempts to regain control of the Syrian territo-
ry as a whole, whereas Turkey is hostile towards 
Assad and would like to maintain a buffer zone 
in Syria that would be controlled by anti-Assad 
units), in certain situations Russia cooperated 
with Turkey against Iran. For example, the Rus-
sian side cooperated with Turkey in the evacua-
tion of opposition forces from Aleppo and the 
creation of a Turkish-controlled buffer zone in 
the Idlib province.
Russian-Iranian bilateral relations
• The political relations
Over the last five years, there has been an ev-
ident deepening of Russian-Iranian political 
contacts. Each year, President Vladimir Putin 
holds three to four meetings with the Iranian 
president, both along the bilateral formula and 
during multilateral meetings. The fact that Pres-
ident Putin organised meetings at the Kremlin 
for Iran’s Vice-President Ali Akbar Velayati (in 
2015 and 2018) confirms that these relations 
are important for the Russian side. Foreign 
ministers also hold regular meetings. The two 
states hold regular consultations between 
deputy foreign ministers. Other high-ranking 
Although in Syria Russia has convergent 
interests with Iran, in certain situations 
Moscow has cooperated with Ankara 
against Tehran.
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officials responsible for maintaining frequent 
contacts with Iranian diplomats include Mikhail 
Bogdanov, Special Presidential Representative 
for the Middle East, and Aleksandr Lavrentev, 
the Russian President’s special envoy to Syria.
• Russia and Iran’s nuclear dossier
Russia is not interested in Iran acquiring nuclear 
weapons but at the same time it is not ready to 
sacrifice its relations with Tehran to prevent it. 
It treats this issue as an instrument of leverage 
and assumes that Iran acquiring nuclear weap-
ons is merely a matter of time and that these 
weapons will pose no threat to Russia. 
Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergey Rabk-
ov admitted that Moscow joined the process 
of negotiations of the multilateral agreement 
regarding Iran suspending its production of en-
riched uranium (the so-called Joint Comprehen-
sive Plan of Action or JPCOA, signed in 2015), 
when it saw that Tehran and Washington were 
determined to conclude this agreement and 
that Russia’s possible attempts to sabotage it 
would have damaging consequences for Mos-
cow’s relations with both states. This is very 
meaningful.
At present, Russia is positioning itself as 
a hard-line supporter of maintaining this agree-
ment and a fierce critic of Washington regard-
ing the latter’s decision to withdraw from the 
deal. Russia has also been an active participant 
in diplomatic actions intended to convince the 
remaining signatories (which, aside from Iran, 
include Germany, France, the United Kingdom 
and China) to remain in the deal. It has called 
on the European Union to create a mechanism 
to circumvent the economic sanctions the Unit-
ed States imposed on Iran following Washing-
ton’s withdrawal from the deal. The Russian 
side has not launched any specific measures re-
garding this issue and stated that it was waiting 
for the results of actions carried out by the EU 
(the creation of a special mechanism to enable 
financial transactions with Iran that would cir-
cumvent the US’s financial system and would 
not expose companies that do business with 
Iran to American sanctions).
• Economic cooperation
The intensity of economic cooperation be-
tween Russia and Iran has remained relatively 
low, despite the stated intentions of both sides 
and repeated efforts made by  economic min-
istries within the Russian government. Moscow 
hoped that Russian companies could benefit 
from the absence of competition from West-
ern businesses kept out by Western sanctions 
(which Russia did not officially recognise) and 
build a strong position in the Iranian market, 
yet this turned out to be a miscalculation. In 
reality, despite mutual efforts and declarations, 
Tehran and Moscow did not manage to shield 
their economic relations from the impact of the 
Western policy of sanctions. Neither the sig-
nature, in November 2014, of a new contract 
for the construction of two more units at the 
Bushehr nuclear power plant, worth an esti-
mated US$ 10 billion, nor the Russian pledge 
in November 2015 to grant Iran a loan of EUR 
5 billion for the implementation of investments 
by Russian companies, have had much impact. 
As a consequence, bilateral trade, which had 
been worth around US$ 4 billion a year in the 
period between 2001–2010, shrank to a mere 
US$ 1.2 billion in 2015.
It was only after the Western sanctions were 
lifted in the aftermath of the entry into force, 
in January 2016, of the international plan to 
freeze the Iranian nuclear programme that Rus-
sia and Iran were able to deepen mutual eco-
nomic cooperation. Moscow and Tehran then 
At present, Moscow is positioning itself as 
a hard-line supporter of maintaining the 
so-called JPCOA agreement and a fierce 
critic of Washington regarding the latter’s 
decision to withdraw from the deal.
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signed a number of deals, including on the mu-
tual protection of investments, the avoidance 
of double taxation and the facilitation of cus-
toms and visa procedures (visas were abolished 
for organised tourist groups). In July 2016, 
Russia allocated EUR 2.2 billion (out of the 5 bil-
lion loan promised in 2015) for the construction 
of a heat and power plant by an affiliate of the 
Russian state-owned Rostec and the electrifica-
tion of Iran’s railways by Russian Railways.
Those efforts bore fruit in the form of a rap-
id increase in the volume of total trade, which 
grew by 85% in 2016 (it was particularly signif-
icant in the context of the overall shrinkage in 
Russia’s trade in that period). However, in 2017, 
total trade, and especially Russian exports to 
Iran, plummeted again and, as a consequence, 
the volume of trade fell by more than 20% 
(including Russian exports, which fell by more 
than 30%). Figures for the first ten months of 
2018 indicate that the volume of trade remained 
low, as the sustained decline in Russian exports 
could not be compensated by a significant in-
crease in Iranian exports of over 40% (since this 
increase started from a very low level). As a con-
sequence, in 2013 trade with Iran accounted for 
0.5% of Russia’s total foreign trade, whereas in 
2018 the figure was a mere 0.2%.
The fate of the idea to organise a barter agree-
ment of Iran’s oil for Russian industrial prod-
ucts, which was intended as a tool to help Iran 
circumvent Western sanctions, testifies to the 
scale of difficulties hindering the development 
of economic cooperation between Russia and 
Iran. The two countries signed a memorandum 
for that purpose in August 2014, but it was only 
in May 2017 that Iran announced the conclu-
sion of concrete transactions, the volume of 
which was nonetheless five times lower than 
had originally been envisaged (100,000 instead 
of 500,000 barrels of oil per month). According 
to the Russian side, the supplies were launched 
in November 2017, then they were quickly sus-
pended and resumed in September 2018. These 
volumes are negligible and have no impact on 
economic relations between the two states. 
The problems present in the process of nego-
tiating the agreement on free trade between 
Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which 
was announced with much fanfare in 2014, 
may serve as an indirect confirmation of the 
difficulties Russia and Iran have in harmonising 
their economic interests. After four years of ne-
gotiations, only a partial agreement was signed 
for five years covering around a half of total 
trade exchange.
• Military cooperation
Since the early 1990s, Russia has been a major 
supplier of weapons to Iran including a wide 
range of equipment: from tanks and armoured 
personnel carriers, through anti-aircraft defence 
systems (S-300, Tor), to combat aircraft and 
submarines. In 2010–2015, Russia partially sus-
pended the supplies due to the sanctions regime 
that was in force at that time. Joint military op-
erations in Syria carried out since 2015 required 
Russia and Iran to develop contacts between the 
two countries’ militaries and security services. 
In January 2015, defence ministers of the two 
states signed a cooperation agreement providing 
for joint exercises, contacts between command 
structures, as well as exchange of intelligence. 
Two shared centres for the exchange of military 
information and coordination of operations were 
established in Baghdad and Damascus. Over 
the last couple of years, naval forces of the two 
states have carried out frequent joint exercises in 
the Caspian Sea and Iranian officers were invited 
to participate in drills organised in Russia. Mili-
tary-technical cooperation was resumed: in April 
2015 President Putin annulled a decree issued 
The intensity of economic cooperation 
between Russia and Iran has remained 
relatively low, despite the stated intentions 
of both sides.
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by President Medvedev in 2010 which imposed 
a ban on the export of anti-aircraft defence sys-
tems. As a consequence, at the beginning of 
2016 Russia supplied Iran with the first batch of 
S-300 anti-aircraft systems (the signed contract 
provides for the supply of four battalion sets). 
One meaningful symbol of how close military re-
lations between Russia and Iran was the consent 
issued by the Iranians in August 2016 for the 
Russian bombers to use the Hamadan Airbase in 
Iran to carry out bombings in Syria.
• What can we expect from Russia’s policy 
towards Iran?
In a situation of continued major tension in 
Russia’s relations with the United States and 
persistent differences between Russia and the 
European Union, Moscow will continue to seek 
to maintain and strengthen its relations with 
Iran. It seems that at present the resumption 
of the policy Moscow followed in 2008–2010 
is not feasible. It involved Russia abandoning 
its pro-Iranian policy in order to achieve a ‘re-
set’ in its political relations with the United 
States.
The present growing differences between Rus-
sia and Turkey on how to resolve the conflict in 
Syria and the increased intensity of Israeli strikes 
on Iranian targets in Syria will force Tehran and 
Moscow to further tighten their cooperation. 
The situation in Afghanistan, where both coun-
tries have an interest in minimising the US’s 
presence and are ready to launch talks and 
work out agreements with the Taliban, will also 
contribute to further rapprochement.
Generally, Russia will continue to treat Iran as 
its strategic partner because there is more that 
unites the two countries than divides them.
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